By March , the Ethiopians had captured almost all of the Ogaden, prompting the defeated Somalis to give up their claim to the region. Africana: The encyclopedia of the African and African American experience. Do you find this information helpful?
A small donation would help us keep this accessible to all. Forego a bottle of soda and donate its cost to us for the information you just learned, and feel good about helping to make it available to everyone! Yared, E. Previous Previous post: Lewis Hamilton Next Next post: Aliko Dangote By the beginning of the war, the Somali National Army SNA was only 35,men strong and was vastly outnumbered by the Ethiopian forces. However, throughout the s, Somalia was the recipient of large amounts of Soviet military aid.
The SNA had three times the tank force of Ethiopia, as well as a larger air force. Even as Somalia gained military strength, Ethiopia grew weaker. In September , Emperor Haile Selassie had been overthrown by the Derg the military council , marking a period of turmoil. The Derg quickly fell into internal conflict to determine who would have primacy.
Meanwhile, various separatist movements began throughout the country. The regional balance of power now favored Somalia. One of the separatist groups seeking to take advantage of the chaos was the pro-Somalia Western Somali Liberation Front WSLF operating in the Ogaden, which by late had struck numerous government outposts.
A sign that order had been restored among the Derg was the announcement of Mengistu Haile Mariam as head of state on 11 February However, the country remained in chaos as the military attempted to suppress its civilian opponents. Despite the violence, the Soviet Union, which had been closely observing developments, came to believe that Ethiopia was developing into a genuine Marxist-Leninist state and that it was in Soviet interests to aid the new regime.
They thus secretly approached Mengistu with offers of aid that he accepted. The nuances of these modern conditions resist the blunt application of analogies from the past. Past experience suggests that Horn countries will attempt to exploit the Sino-American rivalry to maximize their own power and prosperity.
Djibouti is a case in point. What has Djibouti gotten out of this militarization? A lot, in fact. While local officials reaped the benefits of Sino-American competition, they also increased the danger that competition will turn to confrontation. Recent incidents in Djibouti — where U. The Ogaden War teaches analysts and policymakers that Horn countries such as Djibouti can easily overestimate their own ability to navigate great power rivalry.
As a relatively new arena of strategic competition between Washington and Beijing, the Horn of Africa lacks established treaty relationships and norms of behavior that might otherwise prevent misunderstandings, constrain great power behavior, and limit miscalculations by local powers.
The tragic consequences of the Ogaden War illustrate the risks of strategic opportunism by all players in this fluid environment. Nationalism, regional balance-of-power politics, and internal political dynamics within modern Horn countries continue to transcend the binary logic of great power rivalry.
The most important narratives in the region remain driven by the actions of African states themselves. These states seek great power assistance to achieve their domestic aims but will remain flexible in their loyalties. This lesson should inform perspectives on the project of Ethiopian reform under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Abiy, now in his second year in office, has undertaken ambitious reforms to the authoritarian Ethiopian state. Ethnic tensions and political instability, however, threaten this reform agenda.
An estimated 2. The year-old leader has already put down two coup attempts, one by famously challenging revolting soldiers to a push-up contest. The modern Ethiopian state has historically pursued close ties with both Beijing and Washington. For example, the regime of Prime Minister Melas Zenawi, who governed Ethiopia from until his death in , simultaneously secured both extensive Chinese economic investments to revitalize its economy and U.
Viewed from this lens, every Chinese project in Ethiopia is not necessarily a threat to U. Both U. Given these lessons and the similarities to the contemporary geopolitical environment, it is vital that the United States define its interests in the Horn independent of Chinese activities.
While select actions, such as construction of the Djibouti base, may endanger American interests, not all Chinese actions in the Horn are inherently threatening, and some activities may be complementary. As the former U. During the Ogaden crisis, Cold War attitudes pushed American decision-makers into a series of choices that ignored the inconvenient nuances of regional politics, and encouraged destabilizing behaviors by would-be partners for the sake of gaining an advantage against the Soviet threat.
Paradoxically, this zero-sum, threat-based conceptualization of U. In the new competition with China, similarly opportunistic zero-sum strategies will be at best expensive and at worst dangerous for U.
Sam Wilkins is an active-duty U. Army Special Forces officer. Image: Wiki Commons Library of Commons. Sam Wilkins. Become a Member.
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